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Abstract: This article focuses on the ancient and modern meanings of the 
“public” and the “private” spaces – carefully analyzed by Hannah Arendt in 
The Human Condition –, and on the way in which these meanings appeared, 
also on how they reflect themselves in establishing the relation public-
private. The perspectives of the relation between “public” and “private” 
shade away the tendency of “being together”, alienating the public space 
from that spectacular attribute of the commonly shared deliberations, 
bringing the decisions towards an absolute sovereignty. Whereas in the 
ancient Greece the question of the conflict between the “public” and the 
“private” has appeared, through the shading of the private sphere and through 
the over-bidding of the public one, in the Western exegesis the inability to 
make a distinction between the public and the private did not have the same 
explanations, but it is rather based on an interpretation and transfer gap. The 
author acknowledges the decline of the “public” to its extinction in the 
totalitarianisms of the 20th century, as being due to the modern loss of the 
meaning and practice of the political action.  
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In 1958 Hannah Arendt published an original study in philosophical 
anthropology. Later, this writing became her most influential work: 
The Human Condition, in which she pleads for a tripartite division 
among the human activities of work, labour and action.  
  One of the most significant problems that Hannah Arendt 
brings up for discussion is the one regarding the relation between the 
political and the social. The author underlines the confusion caused by 
the fact that “political” has been translated into Latin with “social”. 
This contradicts the meaning that the Greeks had attributed to the term 
“political”, which meant that the individual had received a kind of 
second existence beyond his private life, which overcame things that 
were only necessary and useful. Not only that the political was not a 
given fact of life, but moreover it opposed it as a particular human 
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approach through the fact that it escaped the natural need. Action 
(praxis) and speech (lexis) were the specific ways of the political life. 
In the author’s opinion, the Greeks essentially delimited the polis from 
the home. The home and the family represented the place of the 
biological, of the natural need, which was characterized by a strict 
hierarchy (hence by inequality), while the polis was the place of 
equality, of personal freedom, detached from the tension of natural 
needs. Equality meant exactly not being conducted, but also not 
conducting. In this regard there is also certain confusion or rather a 
meaning displacement, in that the “common good” overshadowed the 
political field as it only took into consideration the existence of some 
convergent individual aims and interests. This is a case of expansion of 
the domestic sphere, which favoured, through certain mechanisms 
what Hannah Arendt called the “ascension of the social” to the 
detriment of the political.  
  The private sphere does not oppose the political, especially 
during the modern period, but mainly the social. The initial meaning 
was that of deprivation of something, of decrease of activity in the 
domestic sphere that is the “deprivation” of the political life 
(exclusively human activity). Gradually, through the enrichment of the 
individual sphere, the term lost its negative connotation. The family 
nucleus started to decline, while the social began to function according 
to the family structures. The society became a kind of big family for 
everybody, and the public sphere, a space of individuality, where each 
had the chance to demonstrate that he or she was the best. The 
demographic growth favoured conformism, that state in which “the 
conduct replaced the action”. In this context it is consolidated the idea 
of “natural harmony of interests”, which Hannah Arendt considers to 
have a basis of statistical, rather than metaphysical nature. The 
expansion of the social has determined a state in which neither the 
private (intimate sphere), nor the political could defend themselves.  
  H. Arendt gives a special importance in her discourse to the 
relationship between the public and the private and to their permanent 
dynamics. Starting from the original meaning of the two concepts in 
each case, the author identifies a series of conditions and mechanisms 
through which either the one or the other impose itself on the 
humanity.  
  The public sphere designates “that which is common”. There 
are two aspects of the “common”, each of them constituting in its turn 
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means that which is seen, perceived by everybody. Secondly, it means 
the world which is common to all of us, a unitary whole, which 
“assembles all of us together”. Thus, the existence of reality itself is an 
aspect which derives from the feeling associated with “that which is 
common”. This unitary whole, to which each of us belongs to, 
constituted the foundation of the Christian perspective that saw 
humanity as a corpus, starting from the model of the human body; the 
constituting parts of this corpus were the individuals. The objectivity is 
put forward only starting from the reality of the public sphere, and in 
no circumstances does it mean “something” that remains completely 
independent from the individual, but it has as a sub-layer that which is 
“common” to the multitude of perspectives (Arendt 2007, 52). The end 
of the common world would take place when it would be regarded 
only from a single perspective; in this case there could not exist 
something that is common and the concept of objectivity itself would 
be affected.  
  Starting from these ideas, we observe that the public sphere 
itself, basing on what is common, has its foundation in the 
manifestation of individuality, of some multiple individualities which 
can confine a space of the “common” only together. On the other hand, 
we will see that the “private” is also constituted exactly within this 
dynamic reference to what is public, underlining this complementarity 
of the two spheres, both conceptual and existential.  
  The private sphere, as already mentioned, refers – at the origins 
– to deprivation that is, it concentrates on those essential things, which 
are the only one really human: “The depriving character of the private 
lies at the basis of the absence of the others; the private person does 
not show itself to the others, and that is why, it is as if it did not exist” 
(2007, 53). The one who leads an exclusively private life cannot make 
himself observable; no matter what he does, that thing it is not seen by 
the others. The defining element of the private is constituted by the 
propriety, which should not be confused with richness; richness is not 
necessarily the result of propriety. Private propriety has always had a 
sacred character, as “[…] being an owner means, no more and no less 
than having a place in a certain part of the world and belonging thus to 
the political system that is, being the head of one of the families, 
which, together with others, constituted the public sphere” (2007, 55).  
  The private propriety does not initially hold a value in itself, 
but only as long as it largely legitimates the participation of the 
individual in the political life. At the same time, the political represents AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences      149 
the sphere where only the one who owns private propriety can manifest 
himself: “The private was similar to a reverse, dark and hidden side of 
the political sphere, and if being political meant realizing the supreme 
possibility of the human existence, then having no place that belonged 
to you literally (as a slave) would mean ceasing to be human (2007, 
57).  
  A characteristic of the present-day society is the expansion of 
the social over the private, parallel with a development without 
precedent of the private sphere. However Arendt observes that the 
private sub-layer does not result in a stronger “participation” in the 
political sphere – as it should have happened considering the essential 
nature of the private – but on the contrary. The expansion of the social 
has had as a consequence important mutations regarding the role of the 
public and of the private sphere. On the one side, the public sphere has 
become a function of the private one, on the other side, the private 
sphere has become the only remaining common preoccupation.  
  Propriety has gradually lost its “objectual” character, taking the 
form of “manpower”, and the private confined and consolidated itself 
within the sphere of intimacy, as a last citadel in front of this situation. 
In this way, “the distinction between the public and the private sphere, 
which is seen more from the point of view of the private as from that 
of the political body, amounts to the distinction between things that 
have to be shown and things that have to be hidden” (2007, 63).  
  The distinction between the public and the private, concludes 
Hannah Arendt, suggests eventually a simple fact: namely that in order 
to be able to exist, some realities have to be kept hidden, while other 
ones, on the contrary, have to be made public, and every human 
activity “refers to its proper place in the world”. This is valid for all 
three human activities: work, labour and action. However there is also 
an exception: the goodness that Christianity promotes. But goodness 
has a paradoxical character in itself: on the one side, it needs the 
“other” in order to manifest itself, but the “other” is excluded as its 
assessor, as it refuses any exposure to the public sphere and even to the 
private one (2007, 67).  
  The whole palette of conceptual delimitations, distinctions and 
phenomena that Hannah Arendt proposes in her study aim, as the 
author herself states, not at the exhaustion of the sphere of vita activa, 
but at the political implications and meanings of the discussed 
activities: work, labour and action.  
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